In this paper we explore the factors that determine the level at which World Bank projects are implemented. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is in ‡uenced by the relative importance of local information at the recipient country level. Using an AidData dataset that provides information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we …nd that transparency does in ‡uence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More speci…cally, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by 3 percent.
Introduction
In the last few decades, many developing countries have chosen to decentralize policymaking and implementation authority, particularly in the form of delegation of service delivery systems to local governments. The rationale behind such reforms lies in the e¢ ciency argument, according to which local o¢ cials are better informed on local needs and are more capable to provide goods and services, promoting, thereby, e¢ ciency and economic development (among other see Oates, 1993 ; Bardhan 2002 Bardhan , 2016 ). 1 Following this reasoning, the World Bank has been actively involved with decentralization policies in many developing countries, both funding projects aimed at building decentralized structures, and allocating loans to subnational governments. 2 Although it is likely that aid e¤ectiveness could be improved by basing reform and project designs on context-speci…c knowledge (e.g., Besley Relying on this framework, we examine the choice of aid implementing agencies in World Bank projects. In particular, we are interested in exploring factors that might in ‡uence the choice of a central versus a local allocation of power. Indeed, it seems that the choice of an implementing partnership is going to be one of the factors determining a project'success. Very recently, Shin et al. (2017) , focusing on World Bank projects, …nd that the choice of the implementing agent is a signi…cant factor determining whether a World Bank development project will be successful 1 Another argument in favor of decentralization is that it improves accountability since citizens are able to monitor local governments better than central authorities. Mookherjee (2005, 2006) , however, demonstrate that accountability, e¢ ciency and equity in service delivery may worsen under decentralization due to the proneness of local governments to pressure from local elites. 2 During the period 1990-2006, 47% of the World Bank commitments contained decentralization components (Gopal 2008). or not. 3 Nevertheless, despite the importance of the implementing phase for a successful project, little is known about the choice of the implementation level.
Our speci…c contribution is then to analyze which factors in ‡uence this choice in the case of World Bank projects, focusing particularly on the role of information. Our hypothesis is that, when a recipient country is less prone to release policy-relevant information (it is less transparent), the importance of local knowledge increases relative to that of the donor (in our case the World Bank), and the need to delegate to a local implementing agency increases. Therefore, we want to test whether an informational advantage at the local level can in ‡uence the donor's choice in favor of a local implementing agency.
Analyzing more than 5800 World Bank projects, we …nd that the probability of a project being implemented locally, rather than nationally, declines with a country's level of transparency. More speci…cally, a one standard deviation reduction in transparency increases the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by 3 percent.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y summarizes the related literature, while Section 3 contains some theoretical considerations. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical method and the results. Section 6 contains some robustness checks, while Section 7 summarizes and concludes. Lessmann and Markwardt 2010a, 2012; Oates 1993). Gadenne and Singhal (2014) consider how the tradeo¤s associated with …scal federalism apply in developing countries and discuss reasons for their relatively low levels of decentralization. Mookherjee (2005, 2006) demonstrate that accountability, e¢ ciency and equity in service delivery may worsen under decentralization due to the proneness of local governments to pressure from local elites. Lessmann and Markwardt (2010a) …nd evidence that decentralization increases corruption in countries lacking bodies which can e¤ectively monitor bureaucrats (such as a free press).
More recently, Asher et al. (2018) focus on the importance of geographical distance, that is citizens' physical remoteness from their administrators, as an important factor that constrains the state's ability to provide public goods to all citizens. Using rich data on Indian villages, they show that greater distance to administration reduces a village's access to public goods and worsens welfare. 4 At least for roads, these e¤ects are not driven by the higher cost of construction in remote villages, but higher cost of monitoring road quality. Hence, their results suggest that reducing the distance between the state and its citizens can help to mitigate the large spatial disparities in living standards observed within many developing countries. While they focus on the costs to the state of supplying public goods and monitoring their quality, which increases with the distance between citizens and the state, in our paper we focus on the importance of the local knowledge for the optimal allocation of implementing power.
As foreign aid is concerned, despite the increasing number of aid projects allocated locally, the role of the federal structure of aid-receiving countries in a¤ecting both aid allocation and e¢ ciency has generally been neglected by the literature. An exception is provided by Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) , who examine whether the degree of …scal decentralization matters in explaining the e¤ect of aid on growth. Using panel data for 60 developing countries during the period 1966-2001, the authors …nd that foreign aid increases economic growth in highly centralized economies, while it may be even harmful in decentralized countries. Case study analysis leads them to conclude that increased corruption and coordination problems are the most likely transmission channels through which decentralization a¤ects aid e¤ectiveness.
The second strand of literature to which this paper relates is primarily concerned with the role of information in designing development reforms. Quite a few papers have argued that institutions, organizations, and policies are context-speci…c and that conditional programs should suit better Although it is likely that aid "e¤ectiveness" could be improved by basing reform and project designs on context-speci…c knowledge, the extent to which such information is actually used in aid allocation and implementation has rarely been investigated. 5 An exception is provided by Dreher et al. (2017) , who have shown that bilateral donors may choose to delegate some control rights over policies to recipients in order to exploit their local information. 6 More speci…cally, Dreher et al. (2017) examine the role of information transmission in the context of aid programs. They investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the project are di¤erent, and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most e¤ective policies.
Their theoretical results show that donors should stay in control (centralized aid) of the use of their funds when their own private information is more important than the private information of the recipient. When local knowledge is instead crucial, an increase in the di¤erence of preferences between donors and recipients can increase the leeway that donors should grant the recipients (decentralized aid), as they become less likely to communicate truthfully. Testing the model using 5 In di¤erent contexts, Marchesi et al. (2011) , who-building on the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel 1982 , Dessein 2002 , Harris and Raviv 2005 )-have identi…ed and tested the conditions under which it is optimal for the IMF to delegate control to a recipient country in order to maximize the quality of a reform program. More recently, explore the role of information transmission in explaining the optimal degree of decentralization across countries. 6 Basurto et al. (2015) have shown that a decentralized allocation of subsidies in rural Malawi may o¤er informational advantages, despite of being prone to elite capture. In a recent book, Honig (2018) argues that local information is particularly important to donors when they are working in fragile states (where levels of central government transparency are generally very low). dyadic data for 28 bilateral aid donors and 112 recipients, over the years 1995-2010, they …nd that misaligned interests and informational asymmetries indeed in ‡uence the shares of aid given as budget and project aid, which represent decentralized and centralized aid respectively.
Finally, the contribution of this paper is also empirical. This paper is related to a growing body of literature which focuses on project-level aid (rather than country-level), especially in the case One of the important factors for a successful allocation would be the expertise of the related implementing partner, such as skills (knowledge and experience) and governance (organizational and institutional aspects). By considering project preparation, Kilby (2015) represents an exception.
He …nds substantially shorter project preparation periods for World Bank loans to countries that are geopolitically important (especially to the U.S.). This channel of donor in ‡uence provides a new angle to examine the cost of favoritism and the impact of project preparation. 7 Despite the importance of the implementing partner for project e¤ectiveness (e.g., Shin et al.
2017)
, to the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper that investigates the allocation of the implementing power, and, especially, the determinants of a central versus a local allocation of implementing power in this context. In particular, we contribute to the literature analyzing the role of information in the choice of the implementation level, between national and local, of World Bank projects. (2018) to this framework, we identify the transmission of information between government levels, with misaligned interests, as an additional mechanism to understand the degree of decentralization in project implementation.
Theoretical considerations
In the current setting, the choice of a national vs. local level of project implementation resembles the choice of a "decentralization vs. centralization" policy scheme, as modelled in , and we plan to test whether informational asymmetry between central and local government and, more speci…cally, the importance of local knowledge, may explain (among other factors) the choice of a local implementing agency. Asymmetry of information is assumed to be one-sided, namely it is the local level of government which is assumed to have greater proximity to the 'local business environment'relative to central government o¢ cials (and to the donor) and to have better knowledge about the risks and opportunities of local investment projects. The local government is also assumed to be more subject than the national apparatus to the pressure of local interest groups. 8 Information is assumed to be "soft", that is it cannot be veri…ed or it is prohibitively costly to verify.
Whenever the interests of the two levels of government di¤er, the quality of the information will depend on such con ‡icts of interest, with the central government rationally expecting the information transmitted by the local to be distorted (cheap talk game). Within this broad perspective, this paper focuses on the comparison of two types of incentive structures, relative to the quality of the transmitted information: "centralization" and "decentralization." Under centralization, project implementation is assigned to the national government, whereas under decentralization it is assigned locally. According to the results derived in , decentralization prevails when the importance of the local government's private knowledge dominates the size of the con ‡icts of interest. Thus, an immediate empirical implication of the theoretical analysis was to investigate the allocation of "implementation power" to information transmission problems.
In our context, however, there is another agent with its own decision rights, namely the donor (the World Bank), which faces a trade-o¤ between loss of control and loss of information, when deciding the optimal allocation of implementing power. The World Bank is assumed to be a benevolent multilateral institution, helping countries implement projects to raise quality of people's lives. As we assume a benevolent institution, we do not consider the World Bank's concern for the interests of some "special" shareholders, which is indeed a strong assumption but it allows us to focus on the issue of information transmission and its implications for the choice of the implementation level. 9 Furthermore, for simplicity of exposition, we also assume that the donor can always take (and enforce) the decision regarding the level of implementation. The results, however, would not change if we assume that this decision is taken by the central government. As previously demonstrated ), it will be in the central government's interest to have the project implemented locally when transparency is low. 10 Therefore, delegation to a local implementing agency should prevail when the advantages of the local information are high enough to dominate the costs due to loss of control, but not for other reasons. 11 More speci…cally, we argue that the availability of information that is recorded can be limited in developing countries. This decreases the share of "hard" information that can easily be transferred and increases the importance of private "soft" knowledge. The relative share of hard to soft information, in turn, may depend on a country's transparency. In fact, such quality may make, ceteris paribus, the existing informational asymmetry more salient and lead the donor to maintain control rights over policy implementation (i.e., nationally implemented project). Therefore, we argue that the less transparent a country is, the more critical the local information will be. In more opaque countries, it should be more di¢ cult to obtain information from sub-national government institutions, and the need to delegate authority to a local implementing agency should increase.
Data
We use the AidData (2016) dataset, which includes 5881 World Bank projects in the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association
(IDA) lending lines, approved from 1995 to 2014. Among other project characteristics, AidData provides information on the body which is responsible for implementing the project without explicitly coding them. We decided to consider …ve main types of implementing agency: national and local government, public and private company, and non-governmental organization (NGO).
Then, we classify an agency as national (local) when the government responsible for project implementation is the national (local) one, and we code as a public (private) company an agency which is owned or regulated by the government (the private sector). When this information was missing, we collected the required data through the World Bank's project-speci…c documentation.
Following this procedure, we have to exclude 30 projects due to data availability constraint.
Furthermore, since we are interested in the determinants of national vs local allocation of power, we exclude projects implemented by supranational agencies in more than one country (115 projects).
On the other hand, when projects are implemented simultaneously by several agencies, we attribute 9 the same project to each of the involved agency. Our sample includes, thereby, 5736 projects that are implemented in 143 countries. Figure 1 shows the evolution of World Bank projects over the sample period. We observe that the number of projects per year ranges from 250 to 300 until the year 2007 (when it exceeded 300), and it then reaches its peak in 2010 (when 379 projects were approved). After a substantial decline in 2012 and 2013, in the last year of the sample, we detect a sharp increase in the number of projects again. Then, Figure 2 shows the worldwide distribution of World Bank projects. As we can see, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, China, Brazil, and Argentina obtained more than 100 projects during the sample period (with a maximum of 233 projects in China).
On the other hand, a large number of countries was involved in less than 20 projects during the same period. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all countries included in the sample and report the corresponding number of projects. Table 1a shows the distribution of World Bank projects by our …ve types of implementing agency.
FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE
As we can see, the vast majority of the projects is implemented by national governments, typically by the ministries who are directly responsible for the project's sector. On the other hand, there are 767 projects which are implemented by subnational governments. Furthermore, 374 and 22 projects are implemented by public and private companies, respectively. Finally, only 11 projects are carried out by NGOs.
Then, Table 1b presents the distribution of the World Bank projects in our sample, according to our …nal classi…cation between national and local implementing agency. Public companies are coded as national (local) when the level of the government owning or regulating them is national (local).
We need to exclude 11 projects which are exclusively implemented by either private companies or NGOs since in both cases it is impossible to attribute them to any government level. 12 For the same reason, we exclude 59 projects involving both local and national agencies simultaneously.
Consequently, the resulting dataset includes 5666 projects widely distributed across regions and sectors, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 .
TABLES 1a AND 1b HERE
Africa absorbs the largest proportion of World Bank projects, even if local agencies implement only 61 of them. Conversely, in both Asia and Latin America there is the highest proportion of "local projects". 13 Furthermore, Table 3 shows the distribution across the ten major project sectors, as classi…ed by the World Bank. 14 First of all, we observe that only 13 percent of all the projects in our sample are locally implemented. Then, while most of the projects are concentrated in the Public Administration, Law, and Justice sector, these sectors account for only 12 percent of all locally implemented projects. Implementation power is instead more likely to be decentralized when the project falls into the Transportation or Water, Sanitation and Flood Protection sectors.
Finally, while at least 52 projects belong to the Information and Communications sector, none of them is implemented by local agencies.
TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE

Variables of interest
We argue that the share of "hard" to soft" information is decreasing with a country's transparency, especially in developing countries. In fact, the local (soft) knowledge would be more important the less transparent a country is. 2003). Freedom House assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and digital media freedom and categorizes each country with a score that determines the status designation as free, partly free and not free. However it is measured, higher transparency is associated with lower importance of the local knowledge.
What is more, as an additional way to measure the salience of the informational asymmetry, we include a proxy that takes into account the bilateral relationship between the World Bank and the recipient countries. More precisely, we construct a measure for World Bank Experience, calculated by the number of years since the …rst World Bank project in the country. 15 When the "aid relationship" between the World Bank and the country is long, the recipient's local knowledge becomes less important. This is because the donor has gathered experience through previous aid projects; thus it is, on average, better informed on the country-speci…c environment. The need for delegation is therefore reduced by the number of years since the donor had …rst committed aid to the recipient (see Dreher et al. 2017 ). Among the …rst group of variables we include the Total Amount, that is the amount of commitment measured in million U.S. dollars, to capture project complexity. We also include Investment Project, that is a dummy equal to 1 if a speci…c investment project is …nanced, and equal to 0 if the project consists instead in development policy lending (i.e., capturing general budget support), and a dummy indicator for IBRD projects as opposed to IDA lending. Both investment and IBRD projects are generally implemented at the local level. Table A3 in the Appendix, the committed amount varies considerably among types of projects, but the average amount is similar for projects implemented by national and local agencies.
Control variables
As shown in
Nearly 80 percent of the projects in our sample consist of investment projects, con…rming the low and declining importance of budget support, and IBRD projects account for 35 percent of total projects. Finally, we control for project sectors following the same classi…cation presented in Table   3 . Controlling for project sectors is indeed fundamental as it allows us to control for the projects that cannot be "arbitrarily" allocated to the central or to the local government, but they need to be implemented either locally or nationally for their intrinsic characteristics. 16 As country-level variables, we include the Ethnic Fractionalization index taken from Alesina et al. (2003) to capture the in ‡uence of local interest groups, as in previous studies (e.g., Dreher et al. 2018). This index is widely used in empirical studies and is available for a large number of countries. We expect that greater diversity of the population will imply, on average, more substantial di¤erences in the policy preferences between the central and the local government. Therefore, the higher the fractionalization, the higher the distance between the two levels of government.
We include Bureaucratic Quality from the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2012), in which higher scores indicate that the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern.
We expect that the higher the quality of the bureaucracy at the national level, the higher the probability that local governments'bureaucrats are as quali…ed as those in national governments (Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010b) . Thus, the incentives to delegate the project to a local implementing agency is increasing with bureaucratic quality. Moreover, we take into account whether the country has a unitary or federal structure (Federal System) using data available from Norris (2008), since the probability of delegation should be higher in federal than in the unitary country.
We also control for GDP per capita to consider the level of development, and Population, which also captures "need," but can be taken as proxy for the ease of obtaining a country's political cooperation as well, since smaller countries are easier to "buy" (see, e.g., Boone 1996) . 17 This choice is also consistent with the standard speci…cation in the decentralization literature according to which bigger and richer countries are more likely to be decentralized. 18 Table A2, in the Appendix, contains the de…nitions and sources of the variables included in the regressions below, while we provide descriptive statistics in Table A3 . Table A4 shows the correlations of all variables included in the analysis. 19 17 There is substantial empirical evidence linking a country's geopolitical proximity to the World Bank's major shareholders with a variety of types of preferential treatment (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009, Kaja and Werker 2010; Kilby 2009 Kilby , 2013 . We, therefore, included UNSC temporary membership, voting in line with the US in the UNGA, commercial ties with the US or the amount of US aid. Neither of those, however, was found to be signi…cantly associated with the decision of a local vs national level of implementation. Results are available on request. 18 Per capita GDP is included in most studies that try to explain decentralization and a country's (log) population is a proxy for its size that is frequently included in the related literature. See, for example, Panizza 1999, and Treisman 2006. 19 Note in particular that the correlations between the variables measuring the bias and the informational variables are low. 14 
Method and results
In this Section, we examine the determinants of decentralized implementing agencies using logit and multilevel logistic models. First, we use logistic regression to estimate:
where y indicates whether project i in country j at time t is implemented by a local implementing agency. T is the information transparency indicator evaluated at time t 1, X denotes the set of control variables related to project i; Z includs country-level variables evaluated at time t 1. We also include sector, regional dummies and time …xed e¤ects in all speci…cations. Then, we take into account the way in which World Bank projects are nested into clusters (the 143 country sample), and we implement a multilevel logistic regression, considering project level controls only. 20 Table 4 presents our main results. The …rst four columns show the results from the logit speci…cation. In column 1, in which we only include project level variables, the probability of having a local implementing agency is negatively correlated with greater Transparency, at the one percent level. As for the control variables, the coe¢ cient of the dummy for IBRD projects is positive and signi…cant at the one percent level, as expected, while the coe¢ cients of both the committed amount and the investment dummy are not signi…cant at conventional levels.
The coe¢ cient of Transparency remains signi…cant but slightly decreases in size in column 2, in which we also control for Ethnic Fractionalization. The sign of the coe¢ cient of this variable indicates that, as the racial and linguistic heterogeneity increases, the distance between the preferences of the World Bank and that of the recipient governments also increases, leading to lower incentives to delegate the project implementation to a local agency. The results are quite similar when we control for a country being a federal or a unitary one (column 3). The coe¢ cient of Finally, in column 5, we estimate a multilevel logistic model to account for the fact that the observations within the same country are not independent. We consider this speci…cation as our preferred one as it allows us to control for time-invariant country characteristics. 21 The coe¢ cient of Transparency is still negative and highly signi…cant, although its size is lower than in previous estimations. Considering its marginal e¤ects, one standard deviation increase in transparency would decrease the probability of having a local implementing agency by about 3 percent. Although this percentage is not very high, the impact of information on the choice of the implementation level has a considerable magnitude in economic terms, given the low proportion of projects implemented by local agencies. Besides, we adopt two alternative speci…cations in which we split our sample distinguishing by di¤erent sectors. As sector analysis is concerned, in order to obtain within sector variation, we decided to aggregate the original ten types of sectors into …ve macro ones. More speci…cally, we aggregate: a) agriculture, …shing and forestry, and water, sanitation and ‡ood protection We implement a logit (Table 5a ) and a multilevel logistic (Table 5b ) model using our sector disaggregation. As expected, the results presented in Table 5b show that the coe¢ cient of transparency is negative and signi…cant, at the one percent level, for the four macro sectors that are more likely to be associated to locally implemented projects (Agriculture and Water, Health and other social Services, Energy and Industry, and Transportation and Communications). On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of transparency is positive, but not signi…cant at conventional levels, in the case of projects related to Public Administration and Finance, a macro sector typically dealing with national policies. 22 Thus, the role of information in determining the choice of a local implementation is only e¤ective in projects related to sectors for which the local information is meant to be more useful. 22 The results are similar in the case of the logistic regression presented in Table 5a . The main di¤erence is that the coe¢ cient of the macro sector Energy and Industry is negative but not signi…cant.
Robustness checks
This Section contains some robustness checks. We start by replicating the estimates presented in Table 4 using alternative indicators of a country's transparency. Then, we restrict the sample to i) projects evaluated either as "satisfactory" or "highly satisfactory", ii) countries with "good political institutions". Table 6a presents the results obtained using four alternative indicators of information transparency.
As described in Section 4.1, we use the transparency index provided by Hollyer et al. (2014) , the indicator of press freedom provided by Freedom House (2012), the Transparency index built by Williams (2015) and our measure for the World Bank experience in the country. We implement a multilevel logistic model using each of these alternative measures for transparency and controlling for project level covariates.
As can be seen in Table 6a , all our proxies for information transparency are negatively and signi…cantly related to the probability that a local agency implements a World Bank project.
What is more, we …nd that the longer the relationship between the World Bank and the country, the less likely that a local agency implements the project. The probability of a locally implemented project decreases with greater donor experience, con…rming the importance of information for the donor's preference of national over local allocation of power. In particular, one more year of World Bank Experience reduces the probability of "delegation" by 4.6 percent, which represents a sizeable e¤ect. Furthermore, as Table 6b shows, the results are robust to including World Bank Experience together with our alternative proxies for a country's transparency. In particular, in column 1, a one standard deviation increase in Transparency reduces the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by up to 2.7 percent, whereas one more year of World Bank Experience leads to a reduction in this probability of about 1.7 percent. 23 
TABLE 6a AND 6b HERE
Finally, we test for the role of information in the choice of local implementation in the case of projects which are less likely to be in ‡uenced by political aspects. Table 7 presents In columns 1-4 of Table 7 , we replicate the estimates shown in Table 4 considering those projects that are evaluated at least as "satisfactory" by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 24 Consistently with previous results, we …nd that both information transparency and World Bank experience are negatively and signi…cantly related to the probability that a project will be locally implemented. In particular, in column 2, a one standard deviation increase in Transparency would decrease the probability of a local implementing agency by about 2 percent, and, in column 4, one more year of World Bank Experience would reduce this probability by 3 percent.
In columns 5-8, we restrict the sample to countries that achieved a score equal to or greater than 6 in the Polity IV Project indicator polity2. 25 This score is both the sample median and the lowest value in order to be categorized as a democracy in the Polity IV dataset. Also in this case, the results hold. More speci…cally, in column 6, a one standard deviation increase in Transparency would decrease the probability of a local implementing agency by about 3 percent, and, in column 8, one more year of World Bank Experience would lead to an increase of 2.4 percent 24 IEG is an independent unit within the World Bank Group that is responsible for assessing programs and activities, making recommendations, and disseminating lessons learned from experience. We consider the outcome rating that evaluates "the extent to which the operation's major objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, e¢ ciently" (see IEG 2018). 25 The "Polity Score" captures regimes'characteristics on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). See Marshall et al. (2018) . of the probability of "delegation" to a local implementing agency. 26 
TABLE 7 HERE
In summary, we …nd evidence that, on average, the World Bank allocates the implementation of its projects to either local or national agencies taking a recipient country's transparency into account. Since Transparency is an indicator of the importance of the local information, ceteris paribus, more transparent countries receive more projects which are implemented at the national level as compared to less transparent ones, which is consistent with both theoretical and empirical This suggests that the World Bank is less in need to rely on the recipient's local knowledge when transparency is high.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the role of information transmission in explaining the choice of a national vs a local level of implementation in World Bank projects. In particular, we empirically assess whether this choice is in ‡uenced by the relative importance of the local information at the recipient country level. Exploiting the AidData (2016) dataset that contains information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, we …nd that, controlling for characteristics at both the country and the project level, (lower) transparency does in ‡uence the probability of a project being implemented locally rather than nationally. More speci…cally, as transparency increases by one standard deviation, the probability that a project will be implemented locally decreases by 3 percent.
The results hold in particular in the case of sectors in which the local knowledge is expected to be more critical (e.g., Agriculture and water, Health and other social services, Energy and Industry, Transportation and communications) but not in sectors typically dealing with national policies (Public Administration and Finance). Moreover, the results are robust to considering alternative indicators of a country's transparency (including the bilateral experience of the World Bank in the country). They also hold when we restrict the sample to projects that obtained at least a satisfactory evaluation, and to countries with good institutions, which should indicate that they are, on average, less in ‡uenced by political factors, which are a possible alternative determinant of local implementation.
The analysis is, of course, limited in several respects. We do not claim to draw causal inferences from the empirical analysis, given the nature of the data available, but emphasize that the correlations resulting from our empirical analysis are in line with our predictions. We would also like to clarify that this paper identi…es the transmission of information between government levels, with misaligned interests, as an additional mechanism to understand the degree of decentralization in project implementation. We do not claim that informational asymmetry should be taken as the only criterion to explain the choice of implementation level of projects, but we only argue that it is essential to consider it when discussing reform design and their implementation. Related to this, it would be important to explore better the importance of political factors (such as the existence of political ties between central and local governments) as possible alternative determinants of local implementation.
Future research might want to analyze whether those parts of projects that are given considering informational advantages are indeed more e¤ective in improving outcomes than others. For example, greater "decentralization" may contribute to the creation of social capital and also increase the e¢ ciency of aid by encouraging greater use of local knowledge in project implementation.
What is more, it might be promising to …nd more reliable proxies for the speci…c importance of the local information, such as those deriving directly from local sources. Finally, we would also like to investigate possible heterogeneous e¤ects across regions. Our preliminary analysis shows that the task is worthwhile and that the conclusions can be instructive and we leave all these 21 questions to future research. Notes: In columns 1-4, the sample is restricted only to projects rated as either "satisfactory" or "highly satisfactory". In columns 5-8, the sample is restricted to countries with a Polity Score equal or higher than 6. In columns 1,2 5, and 6, the variable of interest is Share of No Missing data, whereas in columns 3,4, 7, and 8 it is World Bank Experience. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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